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INTRODUCTION

R.G. Collingwood concludes his book, The Idea of Historv
with a powerful statement.

He says, "We ought by now to realize

that no kindly law of nature will save us from the fruits of our
ignorance."

Collingwood argues that the only way to overcome

ignorance is to have a solid understanding based on historical
thought.

The job of the historian is to search through existing
to

evidence and the theories of other authorities and present what
'\

she believes is the historical truth.
After reading Collingwood and always having had a strong interest
in the Cold War, I was inspired to examine the origins of the
Cold War beneath the popular facade.

The Cold War has intrigued

1-iAJr 'o~l1v..Hcl.-

me because I f-e.-±-t that IJalong with the American publicJnever
knew the whole story.

I believed that the best way to increase

my understanding of the Cold War is to study it from the Russian
perspective.

Nikolai V. Sivacheu, a Soviet scholasalso suggests

that the best way to learn how foreigners view and deal with the
United States is to turn to non-American scholars of distinction
for their country's perception of relations with the United States.
My research is of great value because it attempts to understand
the thoughts and actions of a society with a very different
social and political system from that of the United States.

My

research can dissolve many of the misconceptions about the Soviet
Union and can also provide a deeper understanding of our own
society.

As Collingwood has stated, " ...

mi~conceptions

are a

..

II

constant peril to historical thought."

My research has proven

that misconceptions have not only influenced historical thought
but also world leaders and national policies.
As soon as World War II was over (some scholars argue that even
before World War II was over),

the Soviet Union and the United States

went from allies to enemies almost overnight and hence the Cold
War began.

The arguments and numerous works written about the

Cold War from 1945 to the present is not the focus of my thesis.
My paper attempts to understand the motives and relationships of
the Soviet Union during World War II and how these factors led
to the Cold War with the United States.

My analysis ends with

President Truman taking office because that is when the Cold War
becomes inevitable.

Although tension existed between the Soviet

Union and the United States before and during World War II,

I do

not believe that it was inevitable that these two great powers
would become vicious rivals.

The Russian perspective sees the

United States instigating the Cold War from a position of strength
after World War II.

My thesis seeks to prove that the Russians

have a valid argument.

I do not claim to prove that the Russi a n ]

perspective is correct but I do believe there is a great deal of
historical truth to their perception.
The purpose of my introduction is not only to describe the
objective of my thesis but also to acknowledge the credibility of
my sources.
Soviet Union.

Many of my primary sources are books written in the

I

In doing my research I have been very sensitive to

the obvious propaganda and bias that must exist in these sources;
however,

they remain valuable sources.

These works are instrumental

111

in answering one of the major questions in my paper: What is the
perspective that the Russian government portrays to their people?
Furthermore, much of the information in the Russian books surprisingly
correlates with some of the American sources.

I think it is important

to recognize that Western research is often sunk in bias and
strict analysis is also required in determining the validity and
truth of these sources.
Through my research and studies, I have learned that history
is not universal.

ifs

Events are universal but the histor1 of those

events are often extremely different.

Any good historian must

search for all historical perspectives before he can claim to
truly understand the history.

My goal is to enhance my knowledge

and the knowledge of others in order to bring us closer to a
historical truth regarding the origins of the Cold War.

1

"Never before has there been such utter confusion in the public:
mind with respect to U.S. foreign policy. The President doesn't
understand it; the Congress doesn't understand it; nor does the
public, nor does the press. They all wander around in a labyrinth
of ignorance and error and conjecture, in which truth is intermingled
with fiction at a hundred points, in which unjustified assumptions
have attained the validity of premises, and in which there is no
recognized and authoritative theory to hold on to. Only the
diplomatic historian, working from the leisure and detachment of
a later day, will be able to unravel this incredible tangle and
to reveal the true aspect of the various factors and issues
i nvc•lved. "1
-Geor•3e Kennan
Diary entry, 1950
Just

as~

U.S."""s foreign policy t-,•as guided by mi-:.c:onc:eption

and fear, so was Soviet foreign policy.

Both countries after

World War II were guilty of misinterpreting the actions and
statements of the other.

As George Kennan has suggested, through

time the historian will be able to search through the myths of
both countries and uncover a closer truth about the Grand Alliance
in World War II and its offspring- The Cold War.
The sensationalism and complexity that make up the Cold War
greatly hinder the historian's attempt to unveil some type of
truth.

Any scholar must acknowledge that no one perception has

a monopoly on truth and that t..b.ey all emphasize some aspects of
reality and obscure others.

The task of the historian is to

examine the various perceptions and break them down into
believes constitutes the truth.

what~he

One of the best ways to understand

the Cold War is to research it from the Russian perspective.

The

Russian point of view, like the American viewpoint will also be
filled with irrational assumptions, misinformation, and emotionalism.
However, the shocking fact remains that much of the Russian

2
perspective is based on solid universal evidence that can be
found in many Western sources.

The validity of the perception is

not as important as the insight that the perception provides
about the beliefs, goals, and fears of the people within the
Soviet Union.

The Russian perspective can reveal why the Cold

Har happened, but it can not prove who is responsible.

The

historian must make that ultimate decision.
Alexander Werth claims that the Cold War started in 1917
with the Bolshevik Revolution.2

George Kennan argues that the

Cold War grew out of World War II and "forces inherent in Russian
and American history." 3

Both of these arguments are valid, but

they lack emphasis on the most significant factor that led to the
Cold War- World War II.

Alexander Werth demonstrates in his work

Russia- The Post War Years that tension between the Soviet Union
and the United States had been increasing steadily from the Bolshevik
~<a.J;j~N'«Revolution to WW II.
However, to caII that tension a cold war is
to greatly exaggerate the condition.

Kennan's argument also does

not give enough emphasis to the events and relationships within
NH II.

What is especially disturbing about Kennan's thesis is

that he saw the Cold War as inevitable due to the two opposing
social systems.

George Kennan,

the author of the Mr.

"X" Article

that proposed the containment policy, later admitted the "error
of judgment and regrettable effect" which that policy shaping
article had for several years afterwards.4
By examining closely the interaction between the Soviet
Union and the United States it will become evident that the Cold

3

War grew out of very real policies and personalities not "forces".
As Alexander Werth said, "Today, I think everybody in the U.S.
with any sound historical judgment agrees that the Cold War was
unnecessary."5

The Russian perspective reinforces this idea and

argues that the United States was at liberty after World War II
to

estab~ish

peace throughout the world.

However, the United

States Government panicked over the Soviet Union's power and
prestige after World War II and immediately labeled them as a
serious threat instead of a serious partner.

Historical evidence

provides a powerful argument that the United States was the
intolerant country that could not peacefully co-exist with a
communist power.

There is no doubt that the United States was

the most powerful country, financially and
Har I I.

militaril~

after World

If ~could destroy the Soviet Union) t~ would not

have to share their power.

-;i,_,,pli!.r-i'c

What an easy objective for the American

government, especially when they could disguise it as "stopping
communist aggression."

Stalin was not promoting World Revolution,

he was seeking vital security, and the history of World War II
both on the battlefield and in the summits strongly supports this
argument.
The Soviet Union focuses more

~than

the United

States on

the events of World War II because the "Great Patriotic War"
provides a favorable and valiant picture of the Soviet Union and
its purposes.

World War II was a turning point in Russian history

because the Soviet Union finally gained great power status and
they believed that their courageous fighting in the war justified
~

4

their pot....ier and prestige.
t'tte-01y

Russian writers promote confidently

that the Soviet Union saved the wot·ld from Hitler.

~

Perhaps

this is a slight exaggeration, but it borders on more truth than
many American arguments.

The Russian perspective should leave

any tolerant thinker with a fresh understanding of the origins of
the Cold t.-.lar.
~~

Imperialism
bears the burden and responsibility for World
-----.
~far

I I •6

The Russians believe that both World War I and II were

caused by the imperialist system.

The Soviets identify the main

instigators as the fascist states of Germany, Italy, and militarist
Japan.

However, the other bourgeois democratic nations such as

France, Great Britain, and the United States were also to blame

V\o.~>J~H.

.
.
f or f o 11 oi.-nng
a po l icy
ot- appeasement~, nit l er.

Th e S ov1et
.

Union witnessed the Western powers trying to appease the aggressors
at the expense of Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Spain, and Austria. 7
The Soviets were especially irate over the Munich Agreement of
1938 which partitioned Czechoslovakia.

This agreement by the

Western powers helped build and consolidate the aggressors'
military bloc.

Stalin interpreted the West's behavior as a

blatant policy to channel Nazi aggression exclusively eastward
against the Soviet Union.8
Before the Munich Agreement was made the Soviets had been
calling for collective security against the Hitler coalition.
Stalin had tried to make treaties with the Western countries but
they chose to follow their own policy of appeasement.

Most of
)

the leaders of the capitalist v..•orld t....iere so deepl~i prejudice_;d,

6

their motherland."

Furthermore, they performed their international

responsibility by providing armed resistance for peoples of other
countries.15
Learning about the German invasion of the Soviet Union,
Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared full British support
but also stressed that he had always been an enemy of communism
and always would be.

Churchill's broadcast speech on June 22 said:

"No one has been a more consistent opponent of communism
than I have for the last twenty-five years.
I will unsay
no word that I have spoken."16
However, Churchill went on to explain that any state that fought
against Germany would have British aid:
"The British government would give the Soviet Union any
technological or economic assistance which is in our power and
which is likely to be of service to them •.• The Russian
danger is therefore our danger and the danger of the United
States."17
Britain's terms of cooperation t-..•ere vague initially and they
remained so throughout the war.

However, Churchill's speech was

significant to the Soviets because it meant that the British did
not intend to make a separate peace or strike a deal with Germany.
The Soviets immediately showed their appreciation.

Molotov

cabled to the Soviet Ambassador in London on June 22 to explain
the Soviet Government's position on Soviet-British mutual assistance;
"It 1.,Jill be understood that no Soviet Government

l~Jill

Ft-9-t-

l....iant to

accept British aid without compensation and that it will, in its
turn, be ready to lend assistance to Britain."18
The United

State~who

was claiming neutrality in 1941 reacted

cautiously to the German invasion.

The day before Hitler attacked

7

the Soviet Union, the U.S. State Department sent out a memorandum
stating the United States' policy regarding the Soviet Union.

It

stated:
"We should offer the Soviet Union no suggestions or advice
unless the Soviet Union approaches us.
If the Soviet Government
should approach us directly requesting assistance, we should
so far as possible, without interfering in our aid to Great
Britain and to victims of aggression or without seriously
affecting our own efforts of preparedness, relax restrictions
on exports to the Soviet Union.
In particular, we should
engage in no undertakings which might make it appear that we
have not acted in good faith if later we should refuse to
recognize a refugee Soviet Government or cease to recognize
the Soviet Ambassador in Washington as the diplomatic representative of Russia in case the Soviet Union should be defeated and
the Soviet Government should be obliged to leave the country."19
President Roosevelt was more supportive than the State

Departmen~

and he decided to endorse Churchill and his policies.

FDR believed

that f "Any defense against Hitler ism, any r all)' i ng that the-:.e
forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the
preserrt German leaders and will therefore redound to the benefit
our own defense and security.

Hitler's armies are today the

chief dangers of the Americas."20
.
..
f rom t h
. . 5 R.ooseve l t
Despite
strong oppos1t1on
e .iso l at1on1st,

was successful in bringing the country closer to cooperation with
the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt's strong dislike of fascism and

Harry Hopkins' visit to Moscow greatly influenced FDR's position.
Roosevelt personally despised Nazism because it discredited the
entire capitalist system of which he was a firm supporter.21

On

July 28, 1941, Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins, who was a close
friend of Roosevel/s and the Administrator of Lend-Lease to
Moscow to assess the military situation.

Hopkins returned with a

7

7
the Soviet Union,

the U.S. State Department sent out a memorandum

stating the United States' policy regarding the Soviet Union.

It

stated:

"We should offer the Soviet Union no suggestions or advice
unless the Soviet Union approaches us.
If the Soviet Government
should approach us directly requesting assistance, we should
so far as possible, without interfering in our aid to Great
Britain and to victims of aggression or without seriously
affecting our own efforts of preparedness, relax restrictions
on exports to the Soviet Union.
In particular, we should
engage in no undertakings which might make it appear that we
have not acted in good faith if later we should refuse to
recognize a refugee Soviet Government or cease to recognize
the Soviet Ambassador in Washington as the diplomatic representative of Russia in case the Soviet Union should be defeated and
the Soviet Government should be obliged to leave the country."19
President Roosevelt was more supportive than the State

Departmen~

and he decided to endorse Churchill and his policies.

FDR believed

that/ "Any defense against Hitlerism, any rall~dng that these
forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the
present German leaders and will therefore redound to the benefit
our own defense and security.

Hitler's armies are today the

chief dangers of the Americas. 11 20
Despite stt·ong opposition from the

isolationist~

Roo-:.evelt

was successful in bringing the country closer to cooperation with
the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt's strong dislike of fascism and

Harry Hopkins' visit to Moscow greatly influenced FDR's position.
Roosevelt personally despised Nazism because it discredited the
entire capitalist system of which he was a firm supporter. 21

On

July 28, 1941, Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins, who was a close
friend of Roosevel ..£and the Administrator of Lend-Lease to
Moscow to assess the military situation.

Hopkins returned with a

7

8

positive impression about the Soviet Union and he concluded that
they were not only capable of withstanding the enemy but could
also inflict serious blows.

Hopkins reported to Washington: " I

feel ever so confident about this front.
population is exceptionally good.
to win." 22

The morale of the

There is an unbound determination

Hopkins' report to the government and personally to the

president did much to determine the policy of the Roosevelt
Administration in aiding the Soviet Union.23

Furthermore, British

and American trade unions were increasingly vocal in urging close
cooperation with the Soviet Union.

A United States opinion poll

taken in 1941 indicated that 87% of Americans favored cooperation,
12% were against it, and 1% abstained.24
Britain and the United States recognized that they must
cooperate with the Soviet Union but they also wanted to make
clear their

~hatred

for communism.

The United States and

Great Britain still anti-Soviet agreed to set up the anti-Hitler
coalition.

Britain and the Soviet Union initiated the anti-

Hitler coalition by signing "The Agreement For Joint Action of
USSR and Great Britain in the War Against Germany" on July 13,
1941 at the Kremlin.25

The two basic

t~

of this agreement

were that the two governments would assist each other in all
ways possible against "Hitlerite Germany", and that neither of
them would negotiate or conclude an armistice or treaty of peace
except by mutual agreement.26
i.-r. CG"~~1

1

"1

The United States joined r, the Grand Alliance on August 14,
1941 when it signed the Atlantic Charter.

The Atlantic Charter

9

became the first document in which all three powers: The USSR,
the United States, and Great Britain joined in a public declaration
of their purposes of action against fascist aggressors.

The

three basic principles in the Charter were: the establishment of
a post war democratic organization formulated by the Soviets, the
American and British intent to achieve "the final destruction of
Nazi tyranny," and it also stated the claim by the U.S. and Britain
to dominate the world.27

-;
. -~ v-1/,
,-:__:·~~
~ ) ...t f1 '

The Soviet Union expressed agreement

with the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter but made reservations if it was to be interpreted to "deny freedom, independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of any state or nation."28
Most Soviet scholars claim that the charter was an important
propaganda ploy for Roosevelt and Churchill because it did not
really disclose the true aims of the American and British governments.
The

id~alized

manner in which Lebedev describes the Atlantic

Charter in his book, The USSR in World Politics implies to the
astute scholar that Stalin also used the Charter as propaganda.
.... .
.
.
1 y b"iasJ,_in s.ome o f
Although Soviet 111stor1ans
are obvious

their research, they still argue a strong point regarding the
anti-Hitler coalition.

All three countries recognized the advantages

of a Grand Alliance but the Soviet Union made the anti-Hitler
coalition a reality.

The major concern of Soviet diplomacy as

soon as World War II began was to unite all the forces opposed to
the bloc of fascist aggressors.

Britain was Stalin's top priority

as an ally because it was the only great power in the war.
Stalin also wanted to promote close relations with the United

10
rtates in order to obtain military equipment and other war materials.
Stalin had to overcome the stubborn resistance of the most influential

!quarters

!

in western countries which opposed cooperation with the

USSR in order to achieve the Grand Alliance.
One of the most interesting facts about the origins of the

Cold

~..Jar

from the Russi an perspective, is the p-r i de a+.-d- significance

the Soviets grant to the anti-Hitler coalition.

First, they make

clear that the Soviets were the instrumental country in forming
the coalition.

They use this basic assumption to prove that

lfrom the beginning the Russians have always been interested in
promoting peace with the Western countries.

They believe that

the coalition proves that countries with opposing social systems
can still cooperate and peacefully co-exist.

As Vilnis Sipols

said in his work, The Road to Great Victory: "Britain and the
United'States agreed to military cooperation with the Soviet
Union- a socialist

state~so

as to strengthen their hand in a

clash with another imperialist group."29

The coalition was a

unique event in history and the Soviets had hoped that it would
set a precedent in the future.

Therefore, they believed that any

tension that had occurred between the two countries was due to
imperialist desires and power, not Soviet aggression.

The sacrifices

of the Soviet people and the "Second Front" issue in World War II
proved sound support for the Russian perspective.
Hitler had destroyed France in two months and Stalin knew it
was only a matter of time before the Nazis would attack Russia.
On June 22, 1941, Hitler started his treacherous attack on the

11
boviet Union with the ultimate goal of crushing socialism.

The

I

~erman

forces launched Plan Barbarossa; an offensive in the three

~ajor directions of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.

In the beginning

~eeks the German troops penetrated deep inside Soviet territory.

ht was the unanimous opinion in the British ruling circles that
lit would not take Hitler any longer to defeat Russia than France.30
I

~ohn

Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London

l
,s.a
i. d ,
"The Russians would be done with in no more than six or

]seven weeks.

The Germans would go through Russia like a hot

!knife through butter."31

Britain and the United States expected

an early German victory; however, the "Soviet-German war was
welcomed mainly as a diversion of German strength from the British

.... ,.,

Isles."~~

Therefore, Churchill continued his ardent spoken support

1of the Russian effort.

Encouraging Stalin to fight onward, for

obvious reasons of self-interest, Churchi 11 proclaimed, "The

Russi an front has not.-.J become the deci si l)e front." 33

:-r

f¥.

~ \(..1 "'~ fi

Much to the Western power~ surprise, the German-Soviet front
did become a major influence in the outcome of World War II.
The first week in December of 1941 marked a major turning point
it the war and in Soviet prestige.

Russia dealt Germany her

first major defeat outside Moscow and in other areas.

Furthermore,

the persistent and courageous fighting of the Russians started to
gain international attention. 34

The United States and Britain

also started to value their relationship with the Soviets more.
In November of 1941, Mackenzie King) the Prime Minister of Canada_)
c:ommented:
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"Never in human history has battle reckoned in machines
and men together, been waged on such a scale. Never have
casualties been heavier.
Only rarely, I believe, has
spontaneous sympathy of people throughout the world been
so aroused."35
rhe Russian morale had been sparked and for the first

time the

Soviets had full faith in their ability to win the war. 36
The United States and Britain were helping the USSR in only
I

ineffective, non-sacrificing ways.

While the Soviet army was

1

fighting fierce bloody battles wearing out German forces,

British

troops were still avoiding any major action against Germany.37
Aid from the United States was limited and came late.

At the end

of 1941, the United States supplied $751 million to all the
belligerent countries with only $545,000 going to the USSR, less
than ten percent! 38

Cordell Hull, The Secretary of State admitted

that American authorities deliberately caused delays in shipments
to the'Soviet Union. 39

President Roosevelt ordered that production

and delivery of lend lease be accelerated and quantities increased.
He said,

"Frankly, if I were a Russian,

I would feel that I had

been given the run around by the United States." 4

°

Furthermore,

the materials and supplies that the Russians did receive were
usually of lower quality.

Stalin's interpreter Berezkhov wrote

in his memoirs, "Soviet citizens are well aware that both the
Americans and the British have airplanes as good as the Germans
or even better, but for reasons unknown none of these planes are
supplied to the Soviet Union."41
Perhaps the reasons were unknown, but it was becoming apparent
that there were conflicting objectives in the coalition.

W.H.

13
rcNeill argues that actually two separate wars were being fought.
The decision to defeat Germany fist was a mutual agreement but

lthe

lack of full scale action by Britain and the United States in

1

rL,

d),,1,1

Europe until 1943, and a major offensive against Germany until

I

~

~

1944, drastically reduced the actual value of that decision.42

Ift

was evident that the coalition could not remove the contradictions

between the two social systems.

Russian historians have a simple

Lxplanation for the split in the coalition.

The USSR was fighting

the war to achieve the quickest possible victory and the Western
powers were fighting the war for imperialist interest.43

During

1the war many episodes reinforced this belief, one in particular

'~~~
.
t..'lf-a-5

the summer and autumn of 1942.

l'grave<=t
l

~

~merican
'

i

,route.

o~~

This periodJw-a-s one of the

times of i.-,1ar for the Soviet UnionJaf't-d the Sri ti sh and
governments decided to suspend convoys along the northern
-.1v-..'i/1f,~i

They ex p-l-ained the cutoff
0

ilosses of transport vessels.

'°'.1

M

the significant increase in

It is true that many ships were

I

!being destroyed by the Germans; however, these difficulties could
have been overcome depending on the command and willingness of
the Anglo-American forces.44

41oespite

the lack of any substantial

assistance to the Russians, having powerful allies had some
psychological importance to the Russians. 45

World War II

was different from any other war to the Soviets.

It was not only

a "patriotic war" in the deepest sense, but a war in which literally
the only choice was between death and victory; and Russians by
the millions were ready to die. 46

During the war, even pictures

of Stalin disappeared from the Soviet press.

This was not Stalin's

14
I

war but a plain war of national survival.

I

The rule in Russia

!till the very end of the war was: "Vse dlya fronta, vse dlya
pobedy - Everything for the front, everything for victory."47
Soviets suffered under brutal destruction and starvation.

The

During

o~

the •Atinter of 1941-42, nearly half the population t4=tat encircled
Leningrad died of starvation.

Starvation was so rampant that the

government turned a blind eye to black marketing of food because
it helped thousands of hungry civilians.

Alexander Werth regretted

to report in his work that among the worst black market profiteers
in the Soviet Union were foreign diplomats in Moscow!48

Words of

praise like FDR's , were about the only form of relief that the
Russians received from Britain and the United States during the
first few bloody years of World War II.

Roosevelt said:

"The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the
Hitler forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the
lasting admiration of the people of the United States •.. The world
has never seen greater devotion, determination, and self-sacrific~
than have been displayed by the Russian people and their armies." 49
h-.

[ebruary of 1943, the Red Army accomplished a glorious
victory at Stalingrad.

W.H. McNeil! writes, "The Red Army had

dealt the Wehrmacht a blow from which it could never recover.
After Stalingrad, victory looked certain and it would be a Russian
victory, for the contributions of the Western allies to Russia's
success were not very obvious." 50

A Russian woman told Werth at

the time, "For the first time in my life, I think we are a very
great people, perhaps the greatest people in the world."51

The

Russian triumph was not only a great military victory, but was
also a victory of international prestige for the Soviets.

Recognizing

15

lthe Soviet Union as one of the world's most powerful and influential
!nations, there was a rising trend in many countries to strengthen
'f\.1,\.-,.,.... 'C

r·elations thJi th the USSR after Stalingrad.

Man~,

{,) ')'-'.

i_...

t ~) J

Western historians

have tried to play down the significance of the Stalingrad victory.
They argue that it was not heroism and steadfastness by Soviet
soldiers but rather bad roads and unusually cold winters that
determined victory.52
this theory.

Russian historians vehemently discredit

Vilnis Sipols states, "Any attempts at playing down

the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad are futile.
scale, the intensity of the fighting,

Its

the military and political

consequences were so great that it has gone down in history as
the major turning point of the war."53
Ironically>victory at Stalingrad was not only a turning
point tot....iards

a- c::le•ser

victor~'

in vforld

~,Jar

initial stepping stone towards the Cold War.

I I, it r,Jas also an
The Russians had

proved their determination and power by defeating the enemy and
now their allies were suspicious.

Vojtech Mastny, who exemplifies

the typical hard-line American perspective writes, "Stalingrad
deprived Hitler the chance to win the war .•• Stalingrad only
increased the uncertainty of who else might dominate Europe
afterward."54

The Western allies in the anti-Hitler coalition

were now worried that Stalin would negotiate a separate peace
with Germany.

The British government went as far as ordering

their Moscow ambassador to investigate Soviet intentions toward
Germany.55

There was very little evidence to support the Western

por,Jers,. suspicions about Stalin during this

perio~

and it

h--..•'-"'1

h..<..

~ JTte-1""'e
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l

accurate to identify the West's behavior as paranoic.

I

Furthermore,

tmerican and British concerns could not have been too intense
because there was still no indication that a second front was on

The suspicions of the Western powers were short lived due to
rhe fact that the Red Army was bringing the Allies closer and
floser to defeating Hitler and the British and Americans had
rardly shed a drop of blood.

!dPcisive
-

-

'.

battlP at Kursk

In July of 1943, the Soviets won another

After the Battle at Kursk, the United

States Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up a document on August 2, 1943

I~f

great significance.

The

documen~

wh~

called for maximum assistance

Ito Russia 1 and Lt was supported by President Roosevelt and Harry

Hopk ins. The document said:
1
I
!.
"In World War II, Russia occupies a dominant position and is
jthe decisive factor looking toward the defeat of the Axis powers
jin Europe •.• After the war Russia would be the strongest nation in
'Europe .•. The conclusion reached is that Russia is so necessary to
victory and peace that we must give her maximum assistance and
,make every effort to develop and maintain the most friendly
!relations t..iith her."56

l
j

Stalin interpreted maximum effort in only one way- a second

lfront.

The second front was a Russian term which defined an

1Anglo-American invasion of France across the English Channe1.57
The delaying of the crucial second front is one of the most sound
land convincinq factors that both American and Russian historians
l~ave

argued led to the Cold War.

Debate over the second front

11nitiated the beqinning of complicated and distrustful relations
I

-

between the USSR and her Western allies.

Stalin had been pushing

for a second front since the Germans attacked in 1941.

As late

I

16

l

accurate to identify the West's behavior as paranoic.

~merican

Furthermore,

and British concerns could not have been too intense

I

because there was still no indication that a second front was on

l

he

~,,1ay.

The suspicions of the Western powers were short lived due to
rhe fact that the Red Army was bringing the Allies closer and
floser to defeating Hitler and the British and Americans had
r:ardl~'

shed a dt·op of blood.

decisive battle at Kursk.

IStates

In

Jul~'

C•f 1943, the Soviets i.-Jon anotl

After the Battle at Kursk, the United

Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up a document on August 2, 1943
w h ,().,_
ff great significance. The documen~ called for maximum assistance

I
(o

Russi a J and ht i.-Jas supported bv President Roosevelt and Harrv

Hopkins.

I

The document said:

j
"In World War II, Russia occupies a dominant position and is
Jthe decisive factor looking toward the defeat of the Axis powers
!in Europe ••. After the war Russia would be the strongest nation in
:Europe .•. The conclusion reached is that Russia is so necessary to
j victory and peace that we must give her maximum assistance and
,make every effort to develop and maintain the most friendly
relations with her. n 56
I

Stalin interpreted maximum effort in only one way- a second
front.

The second front was a Russian term which defined an

!Anglo-American invasion ~f France a~ross ~he English Channe1.57
fThe delaying of the crucial second front is one of the most sound
and convincing factors that both American and Russian historians
have argued led to the Cold War.

Debate over the second front

initiated the beginning of complicated and distrustful relations
between the USSR and her Western allies.

Stalin had been pushing

for a second front since the Germans attacked in 1941.

As late

17
-

~s

1943, Churchill still would not provide a

talin commented to Churchill, "You say that you quite understand
y disappointment.

I must tell you that the point here is not

1ust the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation
,f its confidence in its allies which is being subjected to
levere stre~s." 58

T~e stance of the British and American governments

was also being questioned by the majority of the population in

L

ioth countries.

I

Roosevelt, by 1942 had also started to push for

a second fron'j and he t-,•rc•te to Churchill, "Yout· people and

m~i

ieople demand the establishment of a front to draw off pressure

j

on the Russians and these people are wise enough to see that the

j

fussians are today killing more Germans and
1

.

equipment than you and I put together."59

l

~leas

dest~oying

more

Despite consistent

for a second front, Churchill continued what Stalin called

j

f the

passive war."

The passive war consisted of Britain moving

l

her forces to British colonial possessions instead of committing

j

lto the second front.
Stalin and Soviet historians have interpreted
'
jthe passive war to imply that Churchill's main goals were to

l

:suppress national liberation movements and to preserve and strengthen
the British Empire.

The ruling elite of Britain saw the preservation

:of her possessions, not the defeat of Germany as her top priority.GO

I'And

i

conversely, the second front was a paramount requirement of

1
all Russian policy.
Finally, on April 7, 1944 an announcement promising a second
l~ront

was made and on June 6, American and British troops landed

1in Normandy.

Regardless of the fact that by 1944 the Soviet army

18

riad regained almost entirely what they regarded as home territory,

!

,talin congratulated Churchill and Roosevelt.61

Two days later

Stalin made a tribute to the Allies,. military pro\A.1e-:.s_Jarrd never

f•fore had "Stalin di•played such obvious satisfaction with the
alliance." 62

However, even when the second front was opened,

lnly one-third of Hitler,.s forces fought against the American,

I

British, and French forces.

I

':>
rn the eastern front. 6 -·

Two-thirds of Hitler,.s army remained
wJ, :v.,..

The sec:ond front i ssueJ tttt!rt wi 11 be

examined further in reference to the summit conferences, planted

I

~he seeds of distrust and hostility and they would grow quickly.

I

The Soviets did not leave the war on May 9, 1945 with the
~nconditional

surrender of Germany.

Stalin promised to help

l_.
Jig h t Japan and he entered the war against Japan on August 9,

I

'1945. 64

:

I~ery

Russia was not involved with the war against Japan for

l ong and her

.
impact
was minimal; however, Western historians

I
I

I

i

usually iqnore the fact that the Soviets did help the United
-

states fight the Japanese.

1

~

By the end of the war, the Soviet

soldiers had fought in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
1

Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria, Norway, Denmark,
China, and Korea.

The Red Army had also saved seven million

Jpeople in c~ncentration camps.65

/

Final statistics are only additional evidence ta the condition

I

jof the two ~l_;l~ countries at the end of the war.

Imillion

Twenty

Russians were killed; less than one-half of a million

I

:Americans were killed; 1,710 towns, 70,000 villages, and 32,000

I·industrial
.

.

.
plants in the Soviet LI nion
were destroyed; there was

19

n10 proper·t)' destroyed on the Americ:an c:ontinent; Russian mater·ial

I
I

~osses

equalled 679 Billion Rubles; United States national inc:ome

ilnc:rea~ed $100 Bill::nA,ss~~:r profits equalled $55.2 Billion, and

he United States pe'i-€essed -:;.eventy-five perc:ent of the gold

j

ese~ve~ in the c:apitalist world.66

Despite these overwhelming

tat1st1c:s the Soviet Union did not overlook the role played by

Jhe armies of other countries in securing victory.

A Resolution

Jf the CPSU Central Committee read: "A large contribution to victory
Jn World War II was made by the peoples and armies of the United

I

States, Great Britain, France, China, and other countries of the
inti-Hitler coalition."67

i

All Soviet historical publications

that were used to research this paper acknowledged the contribution
j

bf
.i

the United States and Great Britain in helping defeat Nazi

I

Germany. However, they also strongly denied the widespread Western
li
argument that the United States was the arsenal of victory and

I

~hus

had played a main role in the victorious ending of the war

j

t.-Ji th German)'.

It s.eems. rather odd that such an argument could be

I

made when The Secretary of State's memoirs presented a very different

l

· ,i
1

l

:

i et•..1.

Cordell Hull's memoirs read:
"The United States of America must ever remember that by the
Russian's heroic: struggle against the Germans they probably
saved the Allies from a negotiated peace with Germany. Such
a peace would have humiliated the Allies and would have left
the world open to another Thirty Years War."68

Even British Prime Minister Winston Churchill c:an be cited for
remarking:
"It is the Russian army that tore the guts out of the
German military mac:hine ••. Future generations will acknowledge
their debt to the Red Army as unreservedly as do we who have
lived to witness these proud ac:hievements."69

20
l
l

J

The evidence presented indicates that the Russian perspective

~hat

seeks to explain the relationship between the United States

I

Jnd the Soviet Union during World War II is closer to the truth

l

1han most Western perceptions.

Perhaps some day the contents of

American history courses will include thoughts such as Karl

I

Renner's when teaching students the "facts" about World War II.
Jarl Renner was the Chancellor of the Austrian Provisional Government

l

1n Vienna and was the speaker at a monument dedication to Soviet
ioldiers on August 14, 1945.

He said:

"The happy coming generations will stand before this monument
and admire the heroic deeds and exploits of the Red Army,
the selflessness of the Soviet soldier ... He brought about the
overthrow of the accursed regime of fascist enslavement and
secured lasting peace among the nations of the whole world.
All mankind is indebted to the Red Army."70
How could all these words of admiration and gratitude make
~he

Allies into enemies?

The simple answer is that they were

I

t•nly

words~a.Ftd

~ifferent

I

actions spoke much louder and projected a very

message.

Stalin said to Churchill in 1942, "We like a

'downright enemy better than a pretending friend."71
The United States and Great Britain were not Stalin's enemies,
but as the various summit meetings developed during the war,
Stalin must have begun to suspect that he was dealing with "pretending
friends."

It was within the

several~conferences

of World War II

among the allies that tensions and conflicting goals became a
threat to the "harmony" of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The policy

makers of Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States were
a•.,Jare that the summits 1;,1ere never a great success for
power.

an~'

one

However, the media and public always treated them with

21
~reat

optimism, because they were usually uninformed of the real

I
l

dissent within the Grand Alliance.
~ummits that revealed the true aims of the members of the anti-Hitler

I

~oalition

were: Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

There were numerous

Jther meetings during the war, but these three conferences best

l

jepres.ent the e1..1olving of relationships among the Unites States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.
'
President Roosevelt and Stalin met for the first time at the
I
Teheran Conference, t..Jhich was code-named Eureka.Jon November 28,
1943.
I

At this time, American support for Russia from both the

~ublic
~he

and the government was at a peak.

two countries was evident in the fact that the United States

ldelegation

'

The friendliness between

staved at the Soviet Embassy in Iran for a few days
,

Lntil top security could be provided for them.

While Soviet-

bmerican relations were at a high, British-American relations
were at a low.

Britain was resentful that the United States had

:assumed the role as leader of the Western countries and reduced
I

!

)Britain to a "junior partner."72

ll

!

Stalin immediately recognized the tension between the United

:states and Britain and used it to his advantage, especially over

I

lthe second front issue.

Stalin's main objective at Teheran was

I

jto set a definite date for the opening of the second front.
!Churchill and Roosevelt disputed over how the second front should
jbe implemented and Stalin endorsed Roosevelt's alternative.

The

Jfirm decision taken at the Teheran Conference to open a Second
:Front in Europe in the spring of 1944 was significant.

First it

22

I

Would bring the allies much closer to victory, and it would also

l

ease the building tension among the allies.73

~l

The second front problem had been basically resolved at

Tehera~

j

but tl•JO other issues t-Ftt!rt t....iould drag on to the other

~--·-·----- ..... ''"" :"'-""'"'"'""·

e:onferences...>t~ Poland and ~::1;Jar Germany.

Poland had been a

l

iensitive issue even before Britain, the Unites States and Russia

I

~ad

become allies.

When Hitler was on his rampage in Europe in

1he beginning stages of World War II, Stalin had to make a choice

~bout

Poland.

fl

He had to decide whether to abandon all of Poland

o the Nazis, which would have brought them to a frontier almost

within marching distance of Moscow or to take over Eastern Poland,

~talin
I

made a deal with Hitler during the Nazi-Soviet Pact to

~plit Poland.

While Stalin had set up the Lublin government-.Jl•Jhich

l
became the Union of Polish Patriots in 1943, an anti-Soviet

~olish

government was in exile in London.

o.:ir

!lu:t1 iRg Teheran, Stalin

i

Wanted the Lublin government to be recognized as the official
'government

l.3nd

of Poland.

Stalin called for an independent, democratic,

strong pos t-w.3r Poland.

Iboundaries

lpeople.

He also wanted to establish definite

ykAK'

t·.;A+eh adhered to the ethnic boundaries of the Polish

The basic Soviet proposal was adopted in exchange for

!promises from Stalin to fight in Asia and to join the United

I

Nation-:.•

Stalin also signed the "Polish Treaty of Friendship,

I

Mutual Assistance, and Post War Collaboration."

Stalin's determina-

tion to set up the Lublin government in Poland for strategic
I

reasons was a definite indication of his sphere-of-influence policy.74
The other significant issue at Teheran was the structuring

23
qf post-war Germany.

The United States and Great Britain argued

1

,or the dismemberment of Germany.

They thought that Germany

Jhould be divided into small self-governing states that would be

fuled
~e

by the United Nations.

Stalin thought dismemberment would

dangerous because it would generate an aggressive desire to

,l . -

He favored the supervision of Germany by the victors

unit)'•

lhrough a system of strategic strong points.

No real conclusion

las ever reached at Teheran and the issue remained a topic of

I

treated debate.

l

Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin gave the impression that

1

Teheran t.-Jas basically successful and -i-t represented a ne1..v spirit
l, f

I

Allied cooperation.75

~ortraying

l
keveral
I

In realitv the leaders knew they were

,

a false optimism.

important issues,

WAS

t-Jei"-e vague.

Although the leaders agreed on

the implementation of these decisions

Thet·efore at the next major summit at Yalta,

the

kame issues were hashed out again.
The Crimea Conference or the Yalta Summit)which took place
from February 4th to the 11th of

I

~onference.

ImaJor
.

194~was

the last war time

Yalta laid the ground work for resolving a number of

problems of the post-war peace settlement and above all

I

!those of the treatment of Germany after defeat. 76

I

Although many

;significant agreements were made at Yalta, each of the three
I
I

•

•

.Powers had their own special interest.

According to Russian

i
isources there were essential differences between the war goals of

I

!the Allied powers.

They believed that the Soviet government's

i

main objectives were liberation,

the expulsion of the German

24

clggressors, and

t"S

guarantees, that Germany could never start

j
~nother
.I

war.

Great Britain's aims were to keep her empire and

Jossessions all over the world.

I

The United States main goal was

bA~d

to es tabl i -:.h t,,,1or ld-t,.ii de supremacy dtt€ to her great military

I

-;-

strength and monopoly of atomic wea2ons.
lbjectiues have been

I

exagg~rated,

7 ...
r

Obviously, all these

but the main point is that each

country perceived the other country as the obstacle to their

I

rvital interests" and goals.

~l

The fact remains that much was

accompl i -:.hed at Yalta) but unfor tunatel~' the decisions •..-Jere

I

tio t respected.
Besides basic military matters that were easily resolved,
~he

two most significant issues at the Summit were again, Germany

I

l

~nd

lpn

the Polish dilemma.

The German question was the most urgent

the agenda because Hitler's defeat was almost inevitable by

I
I

now.

The structuring of post-war Germany was deferred to the

i

ioreiqn ministers for future action.

l

- .

Stalin did get approval for

reparat1ons from Germany, but the amount was significantly less
1

l
jt~an he wanted.

Stalin still perc~ived reparations as a major

jv1ctory because it was a critical and vital issue to the people
:of Russia who had suffered such overwhelming losses.
Poland, which Daniel Yergin has labeled the "emblem of the
i

;Cold Wa5" took up more time than any other issue at Yalta.78

The

I

!Allies finally agreed on the borders of Poland but the more
!
I

!difficult problem was the nature of Poland's new government.

The

iI

choices were the Western-supported London exile government that
*"-~

was bitterly anti-Soviet or the Lublin government wf=t-i...eh was

25
~upported

heavily by the Soviet Union.

During the debate Churchill

i

Jaid to Stalin, "Poland was to Britain a matter of honour."

l

~talin

replied,

"To the Soviet Union Poland was not only a matter

l

~f

honour, but also a matter of security."79

I

~oland

Stalin argued that

was not only vital because it was on Russia's frontier but

j
it had also been the corridor for attack throughout history.

The

J

~!lies

l
from

I

agreed to reorganize the Lublin Government with some men

the London and Polish underground.so
Poland and Germany were basically victories for Stalin;

however, Roosevelt also achieved what he regarded as his major

l

~ims.

Roosevelt sold his voting procedure for the Security

l

founcil

to

Stali~which

assured the creation of the United Nations.

Furthermore, a conference in San Francisco was scheduled for
1

April 25, 1945 to establish the United Nations Organization.
I

!

foosevelt also received a definite pledge by Stalin to enter the
war against Japan.

I

Winston Churchill also accomplished his main objective.

He

Lanted to see the restoration of France back to "great power

I;status"
I

as a means of checking Russia's growing power.

Churchill

i

pleaded that "France's friendship was as essential for Britain as
Poland was for Russia."81

It was agreed that France would receive

an occupation zone in Germany.
All three leaders declared a positive evaluation of the
Conference and claimed that the decisions were well balanced.
t'l'.'.hn{ /;.,

(..tr'/

hAcit

Many
Western historians severely criticized Roosevelt's concessions
,....--..._
to Stalin during Yalta; however,

the Soviet Union actually made

26

more concessions.

I

~any

American historian

Western scholars' argument.

contradicts

She concludes, "The decisions

j

!

~t

Yalta involved compromise by each nation and probably more by

~he Soviets than by the Western nations."82

1J

As the '!lied powers aggressively pursued their own interest

at Yalta, the1.1 t~...,e~s ironically signed a document knot"-'n as

!
\
iThe Unity For Peace As For War."

I
j
l

The document stated:

"Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common
determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to
come that unity of purpose and of action which has made
victor~ possible and creation for the United Nations in this
t,,1ar . "8;.:i

Unfortunately the unity that this document proclaimed was never
l
achieved. After Yalta relations would only get worse. The
I

I

~artime

summit meetings provided high level personal contact,

j

~hich the leaders had hoped would dispel suspicions and set a

I

However, as the war drew to a
l
close, tension and suspicion among the allied powers emerged from
precedent for post-war agreements.

j

every angle.

I

The night Roosevelt died, he wrote a letter to

i

thurchill regarding the tension that had evolved between the West

l

~nd

Russia.

L.
tnmly

Till his death on April 12, 1945, Roosevelt clung

to the conviction that no matter i,..1hat differences there

Lere between the Soviet Union and the West, "they could and must

l

be peacefully ironed out."84
Roosevelt's successor Harry Truman would depart radically

~rom Roosevelt's foreign policy, and the chance for peaceful com l ~J

~xistenc:e

l

was shattered.

:;._7

Truman took office and proclaimed a

crusade aqainst world communism.

Truman would go to the Potsdam

27

Conference armed with the belief that Stalin was a "communist
devil",
who intended to dominate the world.85
j
•

Truman was not

only armed with mythical beliefs but also with real atomic bombs.

I

Two days before the Potsdam Conference the United States tested

I

the atomic bomb in New Mexico. Under these conditions, there was
I
iittle doubt that the alliance was over, After Potsdam, there
I

j

was no doubt.
I

'l

The Potsdam Conference took plac:e during July and August of
~

I

Po t s dam t. . i as s i g n i f i c: an t i-n- ti 1a t i t t.. .i as the c: u l mi n a t i n g

1945.

!
I
and

stage of many complex negotiations between the American, Soviet,

j

British governments regarding future Germany.

-

lronic:all~i

it

was also the culminating stage for cooperation among the Allies.

!

The atmosphere had definitely changed from Yalta; there was
little cooperation and lots of opposition.

I

Truman made

obvious by his attitude that the Western allies had no

~
I

cooperating t,.,1ith the Soviet Union.

it~

intention~

Charles Bohlen, an American

~iplomat t...1hc• ac:c:ompanied Trumanrto Potsdarr,;;t..Jrote about a conversation
j
~e

had with Truman on the way home from Potsdam.

Bohlen wrote:

"We discussed the atomic: bomb and how we might use the
security and power it gave us to establish a sound relationship
with the Soviet Union .•• We speculated about methods we might
use, considering everything from a flat ultimatum to the Soviets
to withdraw to their frontiers down to various degrees of
pressure.86"
.
!

In a speech to Congress on December 19, 1945, Truman said, "The

Ipic:tory

which we have won has plac:ed upon the American people the

I
l

~ontinuing burden of responsibility for world leadership."87
I

l

Where could the Russians have ever gotten the idea that their
security might be threatened and that their decisive role in the

28

victory of World War II was ignored?
j
·-.I

Truman's aggressive policy,

the atomic bomb, and the disap-

pearance of a German threat provided a solid basis for the Russian
p~rspective

I

that the United States was the aggressive power

seeking world domination.

Western historians further validated

I

~his Russian point of view.

They argued that the anti-Hitler

!

soalition was a coalition of necessity.

I

~itler

was dissolved,

Once the threat of

there was no reason to remain allies.

The

~merican perspective claims furthermore that the Soviets made it

I

'mpossible to remain allies because immediately following World
I

War II,

they began a policy of aggression and expansionism throughout

~astern

Europe.

!

Many believed as Churchill did,

"The Soviet

I

Wnion had liberated Europe only to establish despotism of the
i

~oviets."88

This interpretation of Soviet behavior and intentions

i

~as a

crude falsification and a slander on Soviet foreign policy.
'I
Scholars who made this arqument did not truly understand the

I

-

6istory of the Soviet Union and greatly distorted the true aims

j
of the Soviet Union in order to diminish their significance and

l

lnfluence in the international realm.

Ithat

if Roosevelt had lived longer,

Alexander Werth argues

the post-war years would have

leen different because he understood Stalin and the Soviet Union.

!

~erth
said, "He (Roosevelt) realized more fully than Churchill
l
.
I

and most of his own advisors that Stalin's suspicious and secretive

Irature,

which had made wartime cooperation difficult, had its

l

roots in history."89
The roots that Roosevelt could appreciate and that Truman

reinforced was Russia's quest for security.

The American historian,

i

d.F. Fleming claims "that for 900 years fear has been the driving
i

force in Russia and that Russian expansionism is explained as a

l

~eaction- as a defense expansion."90

~ram

Just to list the invasions

the seventeenth century to World War II validate the Soviet's

~bsession

with security.

In the seventeenth century Moscow had

!

been captured by the Poles; in the eighteenth century, the Swedes

I

Under Charles XII invaded Southern Russia; in 1812 Napoleon
Japtured Moscow; in 1914 the Germans invaded; in 1920 the Poles

j

invaded again and occupied Kiev; during the Russian Civil War

l

~arious foreign
j

troops invaded; and finally in 1941, the brutal

invasion of Hitler that cost the Soviet Union twenty million

i

people and one-third of her national wealth. 91

7

Most influential

l

t

~esterners believed Stalin's goal after World War II was world
i

-yl-_11'~

j

tevolu ti on and

t~re

he induced rampant aggression in order to

I

kchieve his goal. This i,.._1as the pretext on i,.._1hich the Cold 1.--~ar t.-.Jas
I
~·ased. Apparently thi-:. pretext did not consider the insight of

I

Averell
Harriman, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet
1
Lnion durinq World War II.

~

Averell Harriman wrote to Roosevelt:

I am a-confirmed optimist in our relations with Russia
because of my conviction that Stalin wants, if obtainable, a firm
~nderstanding with you and America more than anything else. He
•:sees Russia's reconstruction and security more soundly based on
He is a man of simple purposes
1,that than on any other alternative.
land although he may use devious means in order to accomplish
\them, he does not deviate from his big main objective."92

l
1

The United States, operating from a position of overwhelming

j

I

power and security must absorb the major responsibility for

creating the notion of a "Soviet crusade"

due to their inexcusable

30
ignorance.

The Western powers convinced themselves that Soviet

policy preached unlimited expansionism, regardless of the fact

!

that
it was financially impossible, unlike the United States
!
~

whose GNP actually doubled during the war.93

J

Q,iui'--

Various evidence

Jonsistently leads back to the point the Alexander Werth argues:
"Security infinitely more than any ideological considerations
which determined Stalin to create in Eastern and part of Central
Europe a 'friendly cordon sanitaire' in place of the hostile
cordon sanitaire which h~d been set up by Western powers at
the end of World War I." 4
f

,resident Roosevelt even admitted, "There was something to be
for the Russian security argument for controlling countries

~aid

~f

the former Western cordon sanitaire. 95

j

Mastny argues, like many other Western scholars and leaders

~hat the Soviet Union was obsessed by an "imaginary danger" and
i
I,

that
security was a fabricated excuse to justify Stalin's intentions.
I
1

~f Russia's history is not convincing enough that security was a
motive, Truman's aggressive attitude and the atomic bomb

~eal

~hould

be more than enough to con0ince any skeptic.

The United

Ij

ltates blatantly instigated the Soviet Union by dangling the
threat of the atomic bomb over their heads.

l

~as
I

The Hiroshima bomb

)

dropped and the notion of security was drastically altered.

f

9loom and desperation overwhelmed the Soviet Union.

They had

l

fought for four bloody grueling years and had lost millions of
l
~i~'es

~

n_f(J)

for nothing.

The United States had the atomic

bomb,._-t-he~'

I
did not need any allies, especially communist allies.

The Soviet

I

Union was in terrible condition and
reconstruction.

needed allies terribly for

The United States was t,Jell at-Jare of

'
UJS

~

position
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O

lf

l

I'
supremac~and

as the citadel of democracy, compassion, and

1ighteousness, it dedicated itself to the Cold War instead of
~eace.

Clearly, the United States had the power to determine the

:j

1nternational atmosphere of the post-war years, not the Russians.
Did the United States not learn the lesson from Hitler about

-

Jbusing power?

I

?

W~·

The first line out of a censored history book from Moscow

~eads:

~

"World War II proved how futile and foredoomed were all

hopes of dominating peoples of the World."96

!

Is this the type of

propaganda that a country who promotes world revolution would

~ispe:se?

I
I
No

The Soviet Union suffered tremendous losses in World
7

War II and h.3d everything to gain from peace('and Truman knel•J it!
matter who the Russians perceive as guilty for starting the Cold

I
!

War,
their plea to end the Cold War is ·not a perception. Preventing
I
''
~nother world conflict was the ultimate goal of Stalin during and

I

~fter

World War II.

Russians today still argue for that same

j

bbjective.

I

~rgument

The history of World War II strongly supports the

that security and world stability motivated Stalin.

l

The same history of World War II also strongly supports the idea

lthat

l
j

the United States was not interested in peaceful co-existence

•

with the Soviet Union and that she used her power gained in World
War II to threaten the existence of the Soviet Union.
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